We consider per-capita carbon dioxide emission trends in 16 early developed countries over the period 1870-2028. Using a multiple-break time series method we find more evidence for very early downturns in per-capita trends than for late downturns, during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Only for two countries do downturns in trends imply downward sloping stable trends. We also consider trends in emission composition and find little evidence for in-sample peaks for emissions from liquid and gaseous fuel uses. These results lead us to reject the oil price shocks as events causing permanent *
Introduction
While consequences of the climate warming remain highly uncertain, most scientists find it likely that emissions of Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases contribute to the warming. The rising atmospheric concentration of CO 2 is generally viewed as the most important cause for the greenhouse effect. Economic actions that seek to reverse the "business-as-usual" trend of CO 2 emissions may prove to be very costly: according to an overview of estimates produced by thirteen research teams, the implementation of relatively modest reduction targets may generate significant annual costs ( [28] ; see also [17] ).
Because of these characteristics, there has been a considerable recent interest in projecting the development of global CO 2 emissions to the future. The econometric approach has been to model similarities across countries using reduced-form models estimated with crossnational panel data on CO 2 emissions and indicators of economic development ( [25] , [24] , [11] , [10] [23] ). The global projections are then based on the assumption that development in developing countries brings about the emission pattern estimated for the developed countries.
Much of the focus has been on a pattern called "inverted U" relationship between emissions and income levels. The relationship is interesting because it implies that future reduction in emissions might follow as a by-product of economic growth. This paper is not about the "inverted U". Rather than testing hypotheses about global similarities in emission-income patterns, we choose a much simpler objective: What are the historical trends in per-capita emissions from fossil fuel burning for those countries which have the longest industrial history? To put this question to perspective we note that percapita emissions from solid-fuel burning, while still significant, are currently below the levels reached close to 100 years ago in many early developed countries. The (nontrivial) national emission histories are thus much longer than the postwar period used in previous studies focusing on the "inverted U". 1 In fact, for most developed countries the national time series of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion can be extended to the early stages of industrial revolution. Using such data over the period 1870 − 1998 for 16 early developed countries we address the phases of per-capita emission development by identifying stable historical trends and structural breaks in trends with time-series methods.
One hypothesis is that early industrialized countries have had three phases in their emission development. The first phase was that of fast growth of per-capita emissions, as early industrialization and development in general was so heavily using coal. The second phase was characterized by less growth due to the shift from solid to non-solid fuels (from coal to oil and gas). This diversification in national fuel compositions was partly induced by local but CO 2 -related pollution problems and technological progress associated with the demand for higher energy density fuels. 2 The third phase followed the oil price shocks of the 1970s 1 These studies consider reduced-form relationships with a wide country coverage, so that it would be hard to extend the data period beyond the postwar era without loosing the country coverage or quality of the data for economic variables. We focus on a subset of countries having a reasonably good statistical basis for the pre-1950 period for the variables we use, so that it makes sense to consider the longer period 1870-1998.
Edmunds and Reilly [22] also have a similar historical perspective but a shorter post-energy crises period. 2 The shift from solid to liquid fuels is an example of the trend toward "Decarbonization", claimed to have been ongoing for the last 200 years [2] . For example, burning wood releases about 10 carbons per hydrogen which permanently changed the structure of emissions from fossil fuels and possibly led to downward sloping per-capita emission trends.
We find evidence for very early downturns in stable per-capita trends, during the first decade of 20th century, for a group of industrial first movers. This is consistent with the above hypothesis. However, we find relatively little evidence for late downturns, during the oil price shocks of the 1970s, which contradicts the above three-phase pattern. there are signs of temporary substitution away from liquid to solid fuels during the 1970s, so that the overall emission levels do not experience large shocks causing general downturns in long-run trends. 3 atom. This ratio is: one-or two-to-one for coal; one-to-two for oil; and one-to-four for natural gas [2] . So, the trend implies that the use of an energy unit produces more water and less CO 2 . 3 That trends are upward-sloping does not, of course, contradict the "Inverted U" hypothesis. What is new here is that our approach puts little weight on the emission peaks of the 1970s which are necessarily important for reduced-form estimations using postwar or shorter data. We find more evidence for structural breaks occurring early and potentially relating to shifts from solid (coal) to liquid (oil) fuels than for breaks occurring late and relating to shifts permanently away from oil.
Our testing procedures follow the general theme of the literature started by Nelson and Plosser [18] in that we identify stable trends in CO 2 series which emissions tend to revert to. 4 In our case, the trend function has potentially multiple data-dependent (endogenous) structural breaks, a possibility necessarily needed since the data spans over a century and extraordinary periods such as the World Wars and oil price shocks. Getting an idea of the time-series properties of the emissions is essential for both understanding their historical behavior and forecasting, and, therefore, we start our analysis by unit root tests, taking the possibility of structural breaks into account. Although we do not want to project national emissions very far to the future without having a structural model, we do project our series through 2028 for two reasons. 5 First, forecasts provide a consistency check for the estimated historical break-structure. 6 Second, forecasts can be used to discuss whether per-capita emissions have already peaked or if such peaks can be expected in the near future. Using this reasoning we find that the early in-sample peaks for emissions from solid-fuels burning for the first-movers in industrial development are the true peaks for emission from this source.
However, we find no such in-sample peaks in non-solid-fuel emissions for all but one country. 4 To this end we use Dickey-Fuller type unit root tests [5] , [6] , allowing for the possibility of structural breaks in trend first introduced by Perron [19] and further developed by Zivot and Andrews [29] and Vogelsang and Perron [27] among others. 5 By the nature of the climate change, only very long-term projections are of ultimate interest. For example, the MIT-EPPA model, which is a computable general equilibrium model, is used to produce projections through 2100 (for the EPPA model, see Babiker el al. 2001 ). The time series approach cannot compete with these projections, so we focus on the historical trends and use forecasts only for the purpose specified below. 6 We will compare our projections with those published by the U.S. department of energy (doe). Our projected total emission trends are roughly consistent with the U.S.doe projections.
This leads us to finally rule out the oil price shocks of the 1970s as events causing permanent changes in the overall per-capita emission trends.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and general characteristics of CO 2 series. Section 3 introduces the econometric methodology, discusses the problems related to breakpoint selection, and explains our operational testing procedures. Section 4 presents the empirical results for total and solid-fuel emissions. Using the estimated models for each series, section 5 introduces the projections for total, solid-, and non-solid-fuel emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Per-Capita CO 2 Series 1870-1998
We use the emission data provided by the U.S. Department of Energy through its Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (CDIAC) [16] . An observation is an annual number giving national emissions in metric tons of carbon from fossil-fuel burning, cement manufacturing, and gas flaring. The vast majority of annual emissions come from two sources, from solid and liquid and gaseous (non-solid) fuel uses. 7 For a country i, burning of a given fuel in year t is burning it = production it +imports it -exports it (
-bunkers it -changes in stocks it 7 We will consider the total emissions and solid-fuels emissions separately. The number for non-solid-fuel emissions is the residual and therefore will not be explicitly presented. Solid fuels include different varieties of coal and coke, and peat. Non-solid fuels include crude and processed oils, natural gas liquids, and natural gas.
which is then multiplied by fuel-specific oxidization and carbon content coefficients (see Andres et al. [1] ). 8 The emission data period is 1751-1998 but we work with shorter period 1870−1998 because (i) this improves the quality of the data, 9 and (ii) at 1870 most of the 16 countries we consider had entered the industrial era. 10 The source of the population data is
Maddison [15] . By and large, both data sets reflect the present national boundaries. 11 Using 8 The first three numbers on the r.h.s. of (1) are from historical energy production and fuel trade statistics.
The last two are available only for the postwar period. The omission of the last two numbers for the pre-1950
period is not a source of large errors because these numbers are significant only for the postwar period. 9 We are aware of two studies addressing the quality of CDIAC numbers. First, Kunnas and Myllyntaus [13] reconstructed the Finnish numbers using domestic statistics and found no great discrepancies (they do find differences by changing the coverage of emissions). Second, the Swedish series was reconstructed by
Kander [12] . For the postwar period, her series is systematically at a lower level than the CDIAC series, but both have the same pattern. This indicates potentially large errors in cumulative national emissions. This error should not affect our qualitative conclusions. In general, our hypothesis is that the pre-1950 data is more accurate for small countries importing most of their fuels than for large countries producing from own reserves (historical trade records are more precise than production records). If there is a systematic error of neglecting early production, this should only reinforce our conclusions regarding early rather than late downturns in trends. 10 We excluded Norway because we suspected a data problem. We included Austria despite the huge territorial changes due to Ausria-Hungary dual monarchy (1867-1918) since per-capita numbers remain reasonable. 11 Territorial changes require a number of adjustments. The population series for Germany was constructed as follows. Using Maddison [15] we obtain population estimates for an area that corresponds to the 1989 borders of the Federal Republic. For 1946-1998 we added the population of the GDR territory, and for 1870-1945 we assumed that the proportion of the population in the GDR territory remained constant (38 percent). Thus, both the population and the CDIAC emission data reflect the present territory of Germany.
these two data sets we construct the per-capital series which we transform into logarithms. 12 The logarithms of national per-capita emissions are graphed in fig. 1 We can now restate the question for our research more precisely. In view of fig.1 , does it seem plausible that the oil price shocks of 1970s or perhaps earlier extraordinary events have caused permanent downturns in national per-capita emission trends? What is the exact timing of these potential structural breaks? To answer this question we will construct time- 12 The CDIAC data set includes per-capita emissions only for the period 1950-1998. To avoid inconsistencies between the population estimates, our per-capita numbers for the period 1950-1998 are based on the
Maddison's population data. We compared our per-capita numbers with those of the CDIAC and found no significant discrepancies. 13 Emissions from cement manufacturing are insignificant and can be ignored here.
series representations for each total and solid-fuel emission series with potentially multiple structural breaks. The representations will help to understand historical emission patterns for these series and also for the residual, non-solid-fuel emission series. The representations will be used in analyzing whether the historical peaks in Table 1 will be exceeded in the near future.
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The Econometric Methodology
The econometric problem is that of choosing between two competing models, both of which are conceivable representations of the per-capita CO 2 series, {y t } T 1 , for a given individual country. Under the null hypothesis, the series is a unit root process. Under the alternative hypothesis, the series is stationary around a deterministic trend function. The behavior of the series is thus very different under the null and alternative hypotheses, and the unit root test can be seen as a pretest for determining the significance of structural breaks. In addition, the unit root test improves the predictive accuracy of emission projections (see, e.g., Diebold and Kilian [7] ). Our purpose is to identify those series which can be represented by a stationary and piecewise linear trend function where breaks are endogenously determined by the data. To make this target entirely clear, consider fig. 3 which depicts the U.S. per- 14 We emphasize that we do not have a structural explanation for the patterns we produce. Our results will indicate interesting across-country differences which may be used later to formulate structural hypotheses.
For example, the substitution between emissions from solid and non-solid fuel uses is likely to depend on national coal reserves, share of exports, or on national fuel composition in general.
capita emissions and a linear trend function with three breaks. We will explain the testing procedure in detail below, but fig. 3 illustrates the general idea: we seek to piece together linear trend segments with data-dependent lengths. The hope is that the estimated trend function identifies the critical phases in historical emissions development and that the trend works well also after the data period.
[F ig.3]
Unit root testing with one break
We consider the following additive outlier (AO) model
where The additive outlier model implies a sudden break in contrast to the so called innovational outlier (IO) model where the break evolves slowly over time. We prefer the AO model here because the main emphasis is on the potential trend break due to, for example, the oil price shock whose effect on the trend of the series can be expected to be abrupt in the annual data we use. The lag length p also turns out to be unity in all cases so that the difference between the two specifications is expected to be minor. 15 In testing for a unit root it will be assumed that a break in trend can only occur under the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. Hence, we are interested in finding out whether shocks to the carbon dioxide series are permanent or whether the series can be characterized as having temporary shocks fluctuating around a broken deterministic trend function. This assumption could, of course, be tested using a test for a break that is valid under both
hypotheses, but such a pretest is likely to distort the size of the actual unit root test, and therefore, we have not taken this route. 16 For a given known break date we could use the two-step procedure of Perron [19] . First, the series y t is detrended by running the following OLS regression
Then, the unit root test statistic is obtained as the t statistic testing for α = 1, t b α , in the regression e y t = αe
However, for CO 2 series it is difficult to ascertain what exact event is a reasonable breakpoint, so we cannot assume knowledge of the break date. Also, estimating this date is of interest in its own right. Several break date estimators in a model like (2) have been introduced.
Because we expect the break to be such that it turns the deterministic trend from positive to negative, the natural estimator is based on minimizing t γ , the t statistic of γ over all possible break dates. This estimator selects the date corresponding to the most negative value of t γ , thus maximizing the probability of a turn in the trend. Vogelsang and Perron [27] have shown that in our setup this estimator selects the correct break date asymptotically, contrary to some other popular estimators such as the one based on minimizing t α . The asymptotic null distribution of the test statistic is derived by Vogelsang and Perron [27] who also tabulate some critical values.
Unit root testing with multiple breaks
Above we described the case of one potential break in the deterministic trend. In practice it is likely that multiple such breaks have occurred. However, directly extending the framework to the case of an unknown number of breaks at unknown dates is complicated, and to our knowledge, such tests have not been presented. 17 To tackle with the problem of multiple breaks we employ the following sequential procedure. Model (2) is first estimated with data from the entire sample period to obtain the estimate for the break date T b and the unit root 17 Lumsdaine and Papell [14] introduced unit root tests in the case where the number of structural breaks is known to be two, but they only explicitly considered models including level shifts as well. are some series for which the unit root null is not rejected in any of the subsample periods.
These cases are problematic because it is possible that a unit root test simultaneously taking multiple breaks into account, would reject the unit root hypothesis. Nevertheless, in these cases we shall conclude that the series is a unit root process.
Having estimated all the breaks, we estimated for each stationary series an AO model for testing the significance of the breaks (if any) and for forecasting. In specifying the model we started out by estimating an AO model including all the estimated breaks and tested the significance of each of them individually using a t-test. If some of the breaks were not individually significant (at the 10% level), the least significant break was dropped and the model was reestimated. This procedure was then repeated until all the included breaks were significant. The ensuing model was used for forecasting, while the forecasts for the I (1) series were computed from autoregressive models estimated for the difference.
Empirical Results

Total Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Uses
The main empirical result is that we find no general evidence for structural breaks causing downward-sloping per-capita emissions during or after the oil-price shocks of the 1970s. We find clear evidence for such late breaks only for the U.K. and Sweden and some evidence for To see how these conclusions were reached, consider table 2 which presents the unit root tests and estimated break dates for the total emission series. The table shows all the estimated breaks but only breaks in stationary series are relevant. 19 The series for the 10 countries mentioned above are stationary. 20 However, not all of the breaks in the stationary 18 Since we generally reject structural breaks related to the oil price shocks, it should be emphasized that our sequential method is not unfair to breaks occurring late in the series. First, a break in the 70s has a chance to be chosen in each consecutive estimation. Second, serious loss of power is not expected in subsample tests either because only relatively large subsamples are considered. 19 Under the null hypothesis, a large shock is a realization from the tail of the distribution for the datagenerating process. 20 For these 10 countries, the unit root hypothesis is rejected in the entire sample at the 10% significance level. For the French series the break point is estimated near the end of the series and the test does not reject, so that the series can relatively safely be concluded to be I(1). Hence we are left with five somewhat problematic series (namely those of Austria, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland) for which the series are statistically significant. This was to be expected because our procedure assumes that in each subsample period there is one break but there is no reason for this assumption to be true. Their individual significance was tested in an AO model as described above. 21 It turns out that the series of Finland, Italy and the Netherlands have no significant breaks, whereas those of Denmark and the UK have two and the rest one significant trend break.
An interesting question relating to the significant breaks is whether they indicate a turn in the trend from upward to downward sloping. This can be examined by computing confidence intervals for the sum of the coefficient of the linear trend and the trend break dummies.
Such 90% confidence intervals are presented in Table 4 . In contrast, the results indicate no turn in the trend of the series of Australia, Germany and the USA.
[T able4]
unit root null cannot be rejected in any of the subsample periods, but as discussed above, they will be classified as I(1). 21 Under stationarity, standard asymptotic theory should apply, and hence, the t-statistics are compared to critical values from the standard normal distribution.
Emissions from Solid-Fuel Uses
The results for the solid-fuel series are presented in Tables 3 and 5 . The main result is that most breaks occur relatively early and that there are much stronger early changes in the slopes of the stable trends than in the case of the total emissions series. The lack of general evidence for late breaks in total and solid-fuel emissions suggests that there is no general evidence oil-price shock related break for the difference of the two series neither, e.g., for the emissions from liquid and gaseous fuel uses. [T ables 3 and 5] 22 We do not analyze the series for emissions from non-solid fuels directly, because in most cases the series are too short for our method.
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We project the national per-capita series through 2028 for two reasons. 23 First, the forecasts depend on the historical break structure estimated above, meaning that by comparing the forecasts with those published elsewhere we obtain a rough consistency check on the estimated break structure. Second, forecast can be used to discuss whether the historical peaks in Table 1 will remain as peaks or if the true peaks can be expected in the near future.
[T able 6] Table 6 shows our estimates for per-capita emission peaks over the period 1870 − 2028.
In view of the Table 6 and the fact that the post-break trends are downward sloping, we can rather safely conclude that total per-capita emissions have in-sample peaks for Sweden suggest that also Austria, Belgium and Denmark have in-sample peaks for the total percapita emissions. 24 The historical emission peaks for the remaining 14 countries will be exceeded in the near future, according to our analysis. In contrast, for most countries, solid- 23 Forecasts for both the "total" and "solid" series were computed either from autoregressions for the difference or stationary AO models, depending on whether the series was deemed I(1) or I(0). For those I(0) series in which no significant breaks were detected, the model, of course, reduces to a regular autoregression.
The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) selected one lag in each case. The stationary AO models were formulated sequentially by dropping the insignificant breaks one at a time, as described above (see, p. 13).
In other words, these models include the breaks in Tables 3 and 5 that are significant at the 10% level at least. 24 However, the post-break trend for Austria and Denmark is positive, so the conclusion depends on the length of the projection period.
fuel emissions have early peaks in the sample, implying that it is the non-solid fuel use that is driving the total. The group of countries with early peaks includes all of the first-movers in industrialization. 
Conclusion
One of the most pressing global climate policy issues is the future development of greenhouse gas emissions. Even the most intelligent emission forecasts have to be based on historical emission patterns. The history, which is extended to the future by projection-models, typically covers the period after the Second World War. However, the history of economic development based on the carbon-intensive energy use is considerably longer than the postwar period: for some early industrialized countries, historical per-capita emissions peaked already before the history of a typical projection-model started. In this paper we attempted to understand the basic trends in the development of carbon-intensive energy use, with a long historical perspective.
To the above end, we addressed the properties of the historical time series for per-capita 25 The U.S.doe forecasts are available also for Japan and the Netherlands. We excluded the comparisons with these two countries because the 1998 levels of the series are different in the two data sets.
CO 2 emissions in major developed countries. We used econometric approach to find "stable phases" for per-capita emission development. We found evidence for a two-phase pattern:
the initial fast growth during the early industrialization followed by an early downturn to a period of less growth in per-capita emissions. Only for two countries could we find clear evidence about a third phase characterized by declining per-capita emissions. A similar two-phase pattern applies for emissions from solid-fuel burning, for most early industrialized countries, with the difference that emissions from this source seem be on a declining path.
The results imply that emissions from liquid and gaseous fuels are mainly responsible for the historical and future growth in emissions; the oil price shocks of the 1970s did not cause general downturns in long-run trends for these emissions. The estimated two-phase pattern for per-capita emissions can be seen as partial "decarbonization" of per-capita energy use.
The process has been important in slowing down the rate of increase in emissions, but there is little historical evidence that it could reduce future per-capital emissions.
While the finding that many of the per-capita emission series are nonstationary may seem confusing, it should be noted that the result does not rule out an equilibrium relationship between CO 2 emissions and economic variables. It is quite possible that there exists a reduced-form long-run relationship between the levels of emissions and income per capita, as assumed by the literature on the "Inverse U". For nonstationary series the existence of such a relationship would mean cointegration [9] . The present analysis is a first step toward cointegration analysis, because a long-run relationship between these variables makes sense only if their time-series properties are known to be similar (the series must be integrated of the same order). However, given that most of the emission series were deemed stationary, cointegration is not meaningful for them, and alternative long-run equilibrium concepts should be entertained. One possibility would be to consider nonlinear models and test for common nonlinearities (see, e.g. Bierens [4] ). Our results about differences in the properties of national CO 2 series indicate potential differences for the nature of national long-run relationships across countries. 
